Operation Goodwood

Operation Goodwood was an attack launched on 18 July 1944, during the Second World War, by the British army to the east of the city of Caen. British VIII Corps led the attack with three armoured divisions, supported by British I Corps on the eastern flank and the Canadian II Corps on the western flank, who were launching their own attack codenamed Operation Atlantic, to capture the remaining parts of Caen that were still held by German troops.

When Operation Goodwood came to a close on 20 July, the armoured divisions had broken through the initial German defences and had advanced 7 miles before coming to a halt in front of the Bourguébus Ridge, although armoured cars had penetrated further south and over the ridge

There has been controversy since July 1944 over the objective of the operation: whether it was a limited attack to secure Caen and pin German formations in the eastern region of the Normandy beachhead, preventing them from disengaging to join the counterattack against the US Operation Cobra, or a failed attempted breakout from the Normandy bridgehead.

At least one historian has called the operation the largest tank battle that the British Army has ever fought

Sherman tanks carrying infantry wait for the order to advance at the start of Operation 'Goodwood', 18 July 1944

On 10 July General Bernard Montgomery, commander of all Allied ground forces in Normandy, held a meeting with Lieutenant-Generals Miles Dempsey and Omar Bradley, respectfully the commanders of British Second Army and the United States First Army, at his headquarters to discuss the next attacks to be launched by 21st Army Group following the conclusion of Operation Charnwood and the failure of the First Army's initial breakout offensive. Montgomery approved Operation Cobra,a major break out attempt to be launched by the First Army on 18 July, and ordered Dempsey to "go on hitting: drawing the German strength, especially the armour, onto yourself - so as to ease the way for Brad[ley]".

In early July Adjutant-General Ronald Adam informed Montgomery that there was an infantry manpower shortage and could not dispatch sufficient replacements to France. This shortage led Dempsey to persuade Montgomery to launch an attack comprised solely of armoured divisions, an operation that would violate Montgomery's personal policy of never employing such a force; as Dempsey could afford to lose armour but not infantry. By mid-July the Second Army had 2,250 medium tanks and 400 light tanks in the bridgehead in three armoured divisions and seven independent armoured and tank brigades.

At 1000 hours on 13 July Dempsey met with three of his five Corps commandersto discuss the forthcoming attack. Later that day the first order for Operation Goodwood was issued. However this document only contained preliminary instructions and covered the operation only in general. It was issued to facilitate the necessary detailed planning by the formations involved and alterations were to be expected. It was also presented in the United Kingdom to request the desired level of air support for the operation. The outline plan was for VIII Corps, with three armoured divisions, to strike south out of the Orne Bridgehead. The 11th Armoured Division was to advance south-west over the Bourguébus Ridge and the Caen-Falaise road aiming for Bretteville-sur-Laize, the Guards Armoured Division was to advance south-east to capture Vimont and Argences, and 7th Armoured Division, advancing last, was to aim south for Falaise itself. The 3rd Infantry Division, supported by elements of the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division, was to secure VIII Corps eastern flank by capturing the area around Émiéville, Touffréville and Troarn. II Canadian Corps would launch an attack, codenamed Operation Atlantic, on the western flank of VIII Corps to liberate Caen south of the Orne river. The two operations were planned to commence on 18 July, two days before the planned start of Operation Cobra.

An attack out of the Orne bridgehead had been proposed during mid-June to be launched by the newly arrived VIII Corps to outflank Caen from the east. The operation was codenamed Operation Dreadnought but was cancelled when Dempsey and O'Connor gave pessimistic reports to Montgomery regarding the difficulties involved in such an operation.

Map shows the planned attack for Operations Atlantic and Goodwood. It also shows where Second Army had confirmed the locations of several German divisions as well as where they believed others where located.

Second Army intelligence had gained a good picture of the opposition Operation Goodwood was to expect, although positions beyond the first line of villages had to be confirmed mainly by inconclusive air reconnaissance. The Second Army was also aware that the German Army was expecting a large scale British attack out of the Orne bridgehead. Second Army expected to initially meet resistance from the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division, bolstered by SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 25 of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. Signals intelligence had identified that the 12th SS Panzer Division had moved into reserve but had failed initially to identify that SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 25 had also been moved back into reserve, an error that was rectified before 18 July. Battle groups of the 21st Panzer Division, with around 50 Panzer IVs and 34 assault guns, were expected to be met near Route nationale 13.1st SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler was identified as being in reserve with 40 Panthers and 60 Panzer IV's. Two heavy tank battalions, equipped with Tiger tanks, were expected to be met. However, their location had not been correctly established and the arrival of a third heavy tank battalion had not been identified. The overall German tank strength was estimated at around 230 tanks. German artillery was assessed as 300 field and anti-tank guns. Second Army believed 90 of these guns were located in the centre of the battle zone, 40 pieces on the flanks and 20 pieces defending the Caen-Vimont railway line. The gun line on the Bourguébus Ridge had been identified but the exact strength and gun locations had not been established.

Second Army initiated a deception plan to attempt to cover the intention of the operation that included attacks launched by XII and XXX Corps. The movement of the three armoured divisions to their staging positions west of the Orne was conducted at night, under radio silence, and covered by artillery fire against German positions. During the daylight hours all effort was made to camouflage the armoured divisions' positions.

The offensive was supported by 760 artillery pieces firing 297,600 rounds,Prior to the assault, the artillery was to suppress German anti-tank, anti-aircraft and field artillery positions. During the initial assault, it was to provide the 11th Armoured Division with a rolling barrage while also providing artillery support to the attacks being launched by 3rd Infantry and the 2nd Canadian Infantry Divisions. Additional artillery units were to be prepared to fire on targets as requested.

The preliminary bombardment by artillery was augmented by a total of 2,077 heavy and medium bombers of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and United States Army Air Force (USAAF), flying in three waves. A planned second strike by the heavy bombers during the afternoon of the first day to support the advance towards the Bourguébus Ridgewas rejected by Dempsey who believed that if the operation was to succeed his armour could not wait around for a second strike and would have to be on the ridge by the afternoon.Close air support was provided by No. 83 Group RAF. The air force was tasked with the neutralisation of German positions on the flanks of VIII Corps planned advance, strong points such as the village of Cagny and German gun and reserve positions, and interdiction of troop movements. Each brigade headquarters in VIII Corps was allocated a Forward Air Control Post to help co-ordinate air support throughout the operation. Additional support was provided by three ships of the Royal Navy,which were tasked with engaging gun batteries located near the coast in the region of Cabourg and Franceville.

The engineering resources of Second Army, I and VIII Corps as well as divisional engineers were put to work between 13 July and the evening of 16 July developing six new roads from west of the Orne river to the start lines east of the river and canal. Engineers from I Corps were also ordered to build two new sets of bridges across the Orne River and Caen Canal and strengthen the existing bridges prior to the attack. An additional two sets of bridges were ordered to be built by I Corps engineers between the start of the battle and the end of the first day. II Canadian Corps planned to construct up to three bridges across the Orne as soon as the situation presented itself, so that I and VIII Corps would have exclusive access to the bridges across the river and canal north of the city. Engineers from 51st (Highland) Infantry Divisions, with a small detachment from the 3rd Infantry Division, were ordered to gap the minefield in front of the Highland Division's position. They were able to create 14 gaps in the minefield and mark them during the night of 16–17 Julyand 19 40-foot (12 m) wide gaps had been completed by the morning of 18 July. These gaps would allow one armoured regiment to pass though at a time.

The 11th Armoured Division's infantry brigade, along with the both the division and 29th Armoured Brigade's headquarters, crossed over into the Orne bridgehead during the night 16–17 July; the rest of the division followed the succeeding night. The Guards and 7th Armoured Divisions were held west of the river until the operation commenced. As the final elements of the 11th Armoured Division moved into position, additional gaps in the minefields were blown while the forward areas were signposted and routes to be taken marked with white tape and VIII Corps headquarters relocated to Bény-sur-Mer.

At 0100 hours on 11 July, in the aftermath of Operation Charnwood, elements of the 153rd (Highland) Infantry Brigade supported by tanks, launched a raid against the Colombelles Steel works. Their objective was to secure the area so Royal Engineers could destroy the chimneys, used by the Germans as observation positions, and then the force would withdraw. The force was ambushed by Tiger tanks at 0500 hours and the raid was abandoned after the loss of nine tanks.

As planning and preparation for Goodwood was under way, Second Army launched two preliminary operations.

Operation Greenline was launched at 2130 hours on 15 July by XII Corps. Greenline's objective was to convince the German command that the expected assault would be launched west of the Orne River though the positions held by XII Corps. This would pin the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Division in place, facing XII Corps, so that they could not be used to oppose either Goodwood or Operation Cobra. The operation called for XII Corps to secure a corridor to the Orne River via Bougy, Évrecy and Maizet. Like Operations Epsom and Jupiter, the fighting would revolve around Hill 112, 113 and the village of Gavrus.

The 277th Infantry Division and 10th SS Panzer Division, both under the command of II SS Panzer Corps, held the front line, with the 9th SS Panzer Division in reserve. The British attack, supported by 450 guns, along with tanks and artificial moonlight, started well but German artillery fire disrupted the advance. By daylight, XII Corps had captured Bougy, Gavrus, Esquay-Notre-Dame and the western end of Hill 113 but had failed to capture Hill 112. The 9th SS Panzer Division was committed to battle, and by the end of the day had mostly restored the front line. The counterattack against Hill 113 was unsuccessful. The 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division captured Cahier and was only able to retain possession of the village after defeating several heavy counterattacks. Renewed attacks by XII Corps gained no ground, and during the evening of 17 July, the operation was called to a halt and the British force on Hill 113 was withdrawn.

On 16 July, XXX Corps launched Operation Pomegranate. The 59th (Staffordshire) Infantry Division was to capture the villages of Noyers-Bocage, Haut des Forges and Landelle while the 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division was to capture Vendes and the surrounding area. The two divisions engaged elements of the 276th Infantry Division, 277th Infantry Division and the 2nd Panzer Division. The British infantry captured the high ground south of Brettevillette and took 300 prisoners on the first day. The following day, the advance continued and heavy fighting took place on the outskirts of Noyers-Bocage. The reconnaissance battalion of the 9th SS Panzer Division was committed to the defence of Noyers-Bocage and the Germans claimed they recaptured the village, although XXX Corps never claimed to have captured the village as they had been held up on the outskirts. The village was still in German hands by the end of the day but the high ground outside of the village and the village’s railway station were in British possession. The 49th Division was able to capture Vendes and the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division also launched an attack; capturing Hottot-les-Bagues, a village that had defied them for more than a month.

These two operations cost the Second Army 3,500 casualties and no significant gains had been made, but the operations were strategically successful, in that the 2nd Panzer and 10th SS Panzer Divisions had been kept on the front line and the 9th SS Panzer Division had been recalled from Corps reserve, having been forced to react to each threat that developed in the Odon Valley. On 16 July alone, the 9th SS Panzer Division recorded the loss of 23 tanks.

While many positions were devastated some targets, such as Touffréville and Grentheville, were missed due to dust, smoke and the inability of the bomber crews to identify them. Other German strongholds, such as le Prieuré and le Mesnil Frémentel that lay across the British line of advance and contained Panzergrenadiers and assault guns, lay outside the designated bomb zones and were spared. Cagny and Émiéville had suffered heavily under the bombardment however the defenders were largely unscathed and had time to recover and prepare themselves to meet the attack; both locations having clear lines of fire on the route the British advance was to take. Other formations also recovered, such as the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion, and got to work digging out their half buried tanks to be ready for action that same morning. While bombs did fall onto Bourguébus Ridge destroying some guns most of the German artillery and anti tank guns were intact.

The rolling barrage signalling the start of Operation Atlantic started at 08:15 hours. The Canadian infantry and tanks crossed their start line at 08:35 hours, five minutes later the infantry, of the 159th Infantry Brigade, entered Cuverville. The British infantry were able to secure this village and the surrounding area by 10:30 hours however patrols found Demouville to be firmly held by the Germans and further attempts to capture this second objective were put on hold while the British infantry reorganised themselves. The three armoured regiments, of the 11th Armoured Division, had successfully navigated their way through the minefields and had reached the Caen-Troarn railway line by 08:30 hours. The 29th Armoured Brigade had already started to round up large numbers of prisoners, from the 16th Luftwaffe Division, who were still dazed from the bombardment.

By noon however, the 11th Armoured Division's 29th Armoured Brigade had gained almost 12,000 yards.

Medics during Operation Goodwood, 18 July 1944.

The remaining two armoured divisions were still negotiating the river crossings and minefield. The Guards Armoured Division, having negotiated the German forward positions, was held up by flanking fire from Cagny and Emieville. They took all day to clear the defenders from Cagny and, when they had done so, attacked in a divergent direction towards Vimont to the south east (as originally planned, but very much later than envisioned in the original operation orders). Unscathed defenders with well-entrenched anti-tank guns halted them and knocked out 60 tanks. By dusk only a single armoured regiment of the 7th Armoured Division was in action; most of the Division did not finish crossing the Orne until 10pm on the 18th and could not add its weight to the attack. Thus the 11th Armoured Division was carrying the attack by itself most of the day.

The British armour, constrained by the terrain behind the start line, committed the same error that had characterized it in the desert. Individual tank battalions fought unsupported and in succession, rather than fighting together as part of all-arms battlegroups. Unsupported tank units could not easily root out dug-in towed guns, although a combined-arms team of tanks, infantry and self-propelled artillery might have had much better luck. Virtually all the ground gained was won on the morning of the 18th.

The German armour counter-attacked late in the afternoon and fighting continued along the high ground and around Hubert-Folie on 19 July and 20 July, bringing the attack to a halt. On 21 July, Dempsey started to secure his gains by substituting infantry for armour.

Tactically, the Germans contained the offensive, holding many of their main positions though losing the Bourguébus Ridge, preventing an Allied breakthrough. Nevertheless, they had been startled by the weight of the attack and preliminary aerial bombardment. It was clear that any defensive system less than five miles deep could be overwhelmed at a single stroke by another such attack, and the Germans could afford to man their defenses in such depth only in the sector south of Caen.

In all, the British extended their control over an extra seven miles to the east of Caen. In the process they knocked out up to 100 German tanks and took just over 2000 prisoners. At the moment the exact number of German soldiers killed or wounded during this battle is unknown.

Map showing territory gained in Operations Atlantic and Goodwood

A Sherman Firefly crosses 'Euston Bridge' over the Orne as it moves up to the start line for Operation 'Goodwood', 18 July 1944.

The Allied attack had several serious flaws, which were apparent in the planning stage:To mount the attack all three armoured divisions had to cross two water obstacles and a minefield prior to crossing the start line. The Orne River and the Caen Canal ran laterally across the British front, directly in the path of the armoured divisions. Only six small bridges were available to move over 8,000 vehicles, including tanks, artillery, motorised infantry, engineers and support vehicles such as ammunition and fuel supply vehicles, medical units and so forth. It was obvious that a traffic control problem would ensue. Dempsey's proposed solution was disastrous—he directed his Corps Commander (O'Connor) to move the tanks ahead, leaving behind everything else including the infantry, engineers, artillery etc until all the tanks were across. Thus the British combined-arms team was broken up before the Germans fired a shot. Having crossed the bridges, a British minefield laid only days before by the 51st Highland Division had to be traversed. The minefield was a mix of antitank and antipersonnel mines. This obstacle could have been overcome by strong engineer support prior to the battle. However, because the Germans had the minefield under observation from the steelworks, a mineclearing operation would have alerted them to the attack. In the event, several one-tank wide gaps were cleared in the minefield at night. It was known that this would further constrain the movement of Corps vehicles