Battle of Kursk

Soldiers of the SS-Panzer Grenadier-Division Das Reich advance through the southern Voronezh Front

The Battle of Kursk refers to German and Soviet operations on the Eastern Front of World War II in the vicinity of the city of Kursk in July and August 1943. It remains both the largest series of armored clashes, including the Battle of Prokhorovka, and the costliest single day of aerial warfare to date. It was the last strategic offensive the Germans were able to mount in the east. The resulting decisive Soviet victory gave the Red Army the strategic initiative for the rest of the war. The Germans hoped to shorten their lines by eliminating the Kursk salient (also known as the Kursk bulge), created in the aftermath of their defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad. They envisioned pincers breaking through its northern and southern flanks to achieve yet another great encirclement of Red Army forces. However, the Soviets had excellent intelligence of Hitler's intentions. This and repeated German delays to wait for new weapons, mainly Tiger and Panther tanks, gave the Red Army time to construct elaborate, layered defenses and position large reserve forces for a strategic counterattack.

Although often thought of as a tank battle, Kursk as a whole arguably demonstrated the triumph of artillery, infantry and engineers over armour. The Soviet plan was to soak up the German assault in a colossal web of defensive positions, and only then launch their armoured counter-attack. It was also an important air battle, in which the balance now shifted in the favour of the Soviets.

Once the German forces had exhausted themselves against the in-depth defenses, the Soviets responded with their own counteroffensives, which allowed the Red Army to retake Orel and Belgorod on 5 August, and Kharkov on 23 August, and push back the Germans across a broad front.

Though the Red Army had had success in winter, this was the first successful strategic Soviet summer offensive of the war. The model strategic operation earned a place in war college curricula. The Battle of Kursk was the first battle in which a Blitzkrieg offensive had been defeated before it could break through enemy defenses and into its strategic depths

Background

In the winter of 1942–43, the Red Army had conclusively won the Battle of Stalingrad. The German Sixth Army had been destroyed, along with about 800,000 German and other Axis troops, seriously depleting Axis strength in the east.

In 1917, the Germans had built the famous Hindenburg Line on the Western Front, shortening their lines and thereby strengthening their defense. They planned on repeating this strategy in the USSR and started construction of a massive series of defensive works known as the Panther-Wotan line. They intended to retreat to the line late in 1943 and bleed the Soviets against it while their own forces recuperated.

In February and March 1943, German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein had won the Third Battle of Kharkov, leaving the front line running roughly from Leningrad in the north to Rostov in the south. In the middle lay a large 200 km (120mi) wide and 150 km (90mi) deep Soviet-held salient (bulge) in the lines between German forward positions near Orel in the north, and Kharkov in the south.

Most of the German front commanders agreed a defensive stance should be the priority, to contain Soviet offensives and deliver counter blows. Hitler accepted this advice. Erich Von Manstein insisted first strike was still an option and an offensive to pinch out the Soviet bulge at Kursk would be achieveable before moving further south to recover more lost territory. Manstein wanted to attack in May, but owing to the poor tank strength of the German Army, Hitler delayed it until July when newer tanks minimized the risk of defeat. The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht hoped to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front

German plans Manstein pressed for a new offensive along the same lines he had just successfully pursued at Kharkov, when he had cut off an overextended Red Army offensive. He suggested tricking the Red Army into attacking in the south against the desperately re-forming Sixth Army, leading them into the Donets Basin in the eastern Ukraine. He would then turn south from Kharkov on the eastern side of the Donets River towards Rostov and trap the entire southern wing of the Red Army against the Sea of Azov. OKH did not approve of Manstein's plan, and instead turned their attention to the obvious bulge in the lines between Orel and Kharkov. Two Red Army Fronts, the Voronezh and Central Fronts, occupied the ground in and around the salient, and pinching it off would trap almost a fifth of the Red Army's manpower. It would also result in a much straighter and shorter line, and recapture the strategically useful railway city of Kursk, located on the main north-south railway line from Rostov to Moscow. In March, the plans crystallized. Walter Model's Ninth Army would attack southwards from Orel while Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf" under the overall command of Manstein would attack northwards from Kharkov. They planned to meet near Kursk, but if the offensive went well, they would have permission to continue forward on their own initiative, with a general plan to re-establish a new line at the Don River, several weeks' march to the east. Contrary to his recent behavior, Hitler gave the General Staff considerable control over the planning of the operation. Over the next few weeks, they continued to increase the scope of the forces attached to the front, stripping the entire German line of practically anything remotely useful for deployment in the upcoming operation. They first set the attack for 4 May, but then delayed it until 12 June, and finally until 4 July in order to allow more time for new weapons to arrive from Germany, especially the new Tiger and Panther tanks. Hitler postponed the offensive several more times. On 5 May, the launch date became 12 June. But due to the potential threat of an Allied landing in Italy, and delays in armour deliveries Hitler set the launch date to 20 June, and on 17 June it was pushed back to 3 July. On 21 June, he postponed it until 3 July, and then later to 5 July. The basic concept behind the German offensive was the traditional (and, for the Germans, hitherto usually successful) double-envelopment, or Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle). The German Army had long favored such a Cannae-style method, and the tools of Blitzkrieg made these types of tactics even more effective. Blitzkrieg depended on mass, shock, and speed to surprise an enemy and defeat him through disruption of command and supply rather than by destroying all his forces in a major pitched battle. However, such breakthroughs were easier to achieve if they hit an unexpected location, as the Germans had achieved attacking through the Ardennes in 1940, Kiev in 1941, and towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus in 1942. The OKH's plan for the attack on the Kursk salient, "Operation Citadel", violated the principle of surprise: anyone with the most basic grasp of military strategy could deduce that the Kursk salient was the most obvious target for any German attack. A number of German commanders questioned the idea, notably Guderian, who asked Hitler:

The German force numbered 50 divisions, including 17 Panzer and Panzergrenadier, among them the elite Wehrmacht Großdeutschland Division, and the Waffen-SS divisions 1st SS PzGrenDiv Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS PzGrenDiv Das Reich, and 3rd SS PzGrenDiv Totenkopf grouped into the II SS Panzer Corps. The High Command concentrated all their armor, the Tiger and new Panther tanks, and the new Ferdinand tank destroyer, being used as assault guns. They also massed a high proportion of their available air units and artillery, and despite the problems of the German plan it was a formidable concentration of armor.

The German deception plan included defensive-sounding names for major formations. For example, the 9.Armee was given the name "Festungsstab II", Fortress Staff II. Model ordered that recordings were to be made of massed German tanks' engines. This noise was to be played on loudspeakers to confuse the Soviets as to the whereabouts of German armour concentrations. Many German AFVs were painted with new divisional insignia used only for this campaign. These deception measures, however, were generally unsuccessful.

Soviet plans

The Red Army had also begun planning for their own upcoming summer offensives, and had settled on a plan that mirrored that of the Germans. Attacks in front of Orel and Kharkov would flatten out the line, and potentially lead to a breakout near the Pripyat Marshes. However, Soviet commanders had considerable concerns over the German plans.

The locations of all previous German attacks had caught the Red Army by surprise, but in this case Kursk seemed the obvious target. Moscow received warning of the German plans through the Lucy spy ring in Switzerland. This was almost unnecessary, since Marshal Zhukov had already correctly predicted the site of the German attack as early as 8 April, when he wrote his initial report to Stavka (the Red Army General Staff), in which he also recommended the strategy eventually followed by the Red Army.

Stalin and some Stavka officers wanted to strike first, but in a letter Zhukov wrote to Stalin on 8 April 1943:

The pattern of the war up until this point had been one of German offensive success. Blitzkrieg had worked against all opposing armies, including the Red Army. On the other hand, Soviet offensive actions during both winters showed their own offensives now worked well. However, the overwhelming majority of Stavka members, most notably Zhukov, advised waiting for the Germans to exhaust themselves first. Zhukov's opinion swayed the argument.

The German delay in launching their offensive gave the Red Army four months in which to prepare, and with every passing day, they turned the salient into one of the most heavily defended areas on Earth. Two Fronts, the Central and Voronezh, manned the defensive lines, and the Steppe Front was available as a reserve. The Red Army and thousands of civilians laid about one million land mines and dug about 5000 km (3000 mi) of trenches, to a depth of 175 km (95 mi). In addition, they massed a huge army of their own, including some 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces and 2,792 aircraft. This amounted to 26% of the total manpower of the Red Army, 26% of its mortars and artillery, 35% of its aircraft and 46% of its tanks. Due to the disparity in populations, industrial capability, and continual German delays in tank production, the Red Army could build up forces faster than the Germans; each month they pulled further ahead in men and matériel. The Germans also received reports of rapid and powerful Soviet concentrations in the Kursk area, and delayed the offensive to allow for more Panther tanks to reach the front line.

Many of the forces assigned to the defense of the salient were recent veterans of the Battle of Stalingrad, but the Red Army also added over one million new men in the first half of 1943. Thus, the Red Army was larger than in 1942, even after the losses at Stalingrad. The long delay between the identification of the likely site of the German attack and the beginning of the offensive gave the new units an unusually long time to train. The density of artillery in the salient was unusual; there were more artillery regiments in the salient than infantry regiments. The Red Army was determined to grind down attacking German units with a combination of mines and artillery fire. Indirect fire from howitzers would stop the German infantry, while direct fire from 45mm (1.7"), 57mm (2.24"), and 85 mm (3.3") towed anti-tank guns and 76.2mm (3") divisional field guns would destroy the tanks. In the 13th Army sector (facing the German Ninth Army on the northern face of the salient) the density of anti-tank guns was 23.7 guns per kilometer of defended front. In the 6th and 7th Guards Army sectors in the south, the density was lower, about 10 guns per kilometer.

The preparation of the battlefield by Red Army military engineers was thorough. Reports indicate 503,993 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines were laid in the defended area. On average, 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines were laid per kilometer of front. In the sectors eventually attacked, densities were never lower than 1,400 per kilometer and sometimes reached as high as 2,000 per kilometer. Red Army engineers also constructed miles of trenches, laid barbed wire, built anti-tank obstacles, and constructed thousands of gun and mortar positions. Soviet deception plans, like the German, were most elaborate; unlike the German plans, however, the Soviet deceptions were generally successful. Dummy positions were constructed and dummy aircraft were placed on false airfields, and false radio traffic sent to confuse German intelligence. Camouflaging of actual positions and minefields was excellent; the first warning most German units had of the presence of Soviet minefields or dug-in guns was their own vehicles exploding.

Set in the larger vista of the war on the Eastern Front, Kursk is significant because it demonstrated the Soviet high command and staff now worked more effectively than OKH—largely due to Stalin finally being prepared to act on the advice of his professional intelligence and staff officers, while Hitler was systematically ignoring his. This was evidenced by the defeat of the Blitzkrieg in summer campaigning weather and the ability of the Red Army forces to move from defensive to offensive operations due to better staff work, larger reserves and better planning. In these senses, Kursk, and not Stalingrad, can be viewed as the turning point in the war: certainly the initiative passed decisively from the Wehrmacht to the Red Army.

Ground

Waffen-SS soldiers assemble in preparation for the attack. Ground operations begin as Operation Citadel is launched. The new Panther tank made its combat debut at Kursk, pictured here in formation leading the German assault.

It took four months before Hitler allowed Manstein to attack, by which time the Germans had added 90 Elefant Panzerjägers, all 79 flyable Henschel Hs 129 ground attack aircraft, as well as 270 Tigers, late model Panzer Mark-VIs and even a number of captured T-34s. In total, they assembled some 3,000 tanks and assault guns, 2,110 aircraft and 900,000 men. It formed one of the greatest concentrations of German fighting power ever put together. Even so, Hitler expressed doubts about its adequacy. By this time, Allied action in Western Europe was beginning to have a significant impact on German military strength. Although actions in North Africa hardly constituted the Red Army's longed-for second front, the operation there did begin to tell on the Germans, and in the last quarter of 1942 and the first half of 1943, 40% of Luftwaffe losses occurred in the battles over Malta and Tunisia. German air superiority was no longer guaranteed. The Soviet Air Force outnumbered the Luftwaffe, and were gaining in technological quality as well. Both air forces possessed very effective ground-attack aircraft types capable of decimating armour: the Soviet Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik and the German Junkers Ju 87G (Initially Ju 87D-3/5 with a pair of added Bordkanone 37 mm gunpods). The start date for the offensive had been moved repeatedly as delays in preparation had forced the Germans to postpone the attack. Finally, on 1 July, the orders were issued to attack on 5 July. The following day, Marshal Vasilyevskiy warned the Front commanders (N. F. Vatutin, K. K. Rokossovskiy and I. S. Konev) that the long-awaited German offensive would begin sometime between 3 and 6 July. For months, the Soviets had been receiving detailed information on the planning of the offensive from their Red Orchestra (German: Rote Kapelle, and the "Lucy Group") espionage organization, whose sources allegedly included officers in Hermann Göring’s aviation ministry and other parts of the Nazi administration. Preliminary fighting started on 4 July 1943 in the south, as Fourth Panzer Army had elected to try to take Soviet outposts prior to the main assault on 5 July. Thus they deliberately sacrificed tactical surprise. Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin, having received reports that the German offensive was imminent, ordered Voronezh Front to bombard German positions on the night of 4 July. In the afternoon, Stuka dive bombers blew a two-mile-wide gap in the Soviet front lines on the north in a period of 10 minutes, and then turned for home while the German artillery opened up to continue the pounding. Hoth's armored spearhead, the III Panzer Corps, then advanced on the Soviet positions around Zavidovka. At the same time, the Großdeutschland Division attacked Butovo in torrential rain, and the 11th Panzer Division took the high ground around Butovo. To the west of Butovo, the going proved tougher for Großdeutschland and the 3rd Panzer Division, which met stiff Soviet resistance and did not secure their objectives until midnight. The II SS Panzer Corps launched preliminary attacks to secure observation posts, and again met with strong resistance, until assault troops equipped with flamethrowers cleared the bunkers and outposts. At 2:30, the Red Army hit back with an artillery bombardment in the north and south. This barrage by over 3,000 guns and mortars expended about half of the artillery ammunition for the entire operation. The goal was to delay and disorganize the German attack. In the northern face, the Central Front artillery fired mostly against German artillery positions and managed to suppress 50 of the 100 German batteries they attacked, resulting in much weaker German artillery fire on the opening day of the attack. This bombardment disrupted German units and caused them to attack at different times on 5 July. In the south, the Red Army chose to fire largely against the German infantry and tanks in their assembly areas. This was partially successful in delaying the German attack, but caused few casualties.

Northern ground battle

The 9th Army attack in the north fell far short of its objectives on 5 July. The attack sector had been correctly anticipated by the Red Army Central Front. Attacking on a 45-kilometer-wide front, the Germans found themselves trapped in the huge defensive minefields, and needed engineering units to come up and clear them under artillery fire. Although a few Goliath and Borgward remote-control engineering vehicles were available to clear lanes in the minefields, they were not generally successful. Even when the vehicles cleared mines, they had no on-board marking system to show following tanks where the cleared lanes were. Red Army units covered the minefields with small arms and artillery fire, delaying German engineers clearing manually; German losses were high. For example, the German 653rd Heavy Panzerjäger Battalion began the attack with 49 Ferdinand self-propelled guns; 37 of them were lost in the minefields before 17:00 on 5 July. Although most of the lost vehicles were mobility kills rather than permanent losses, they were out of action until they could be repaired. They were also easier for Red Army artillery to knock out permanently. However, since the Germans were advancing, any repairable vehicles could be recovered, repaired, and put back into action. The Germans also noted a fundamental flaw in their armoured vehicles, particularly the Elefant. Although excellent against any Soviet tank at long to medium range, they lacked secondary armament and were vulnerable to attacks from Soviet slit trenches once separated from the heavy machine gun protection of the lighter tanks, vehicles and infantry. Guderian noted in his diary:

Tiger I tanks spearhead the assault in the northern sector.

There are a number of factors that explain the 9th Army’s lack of progress, mainly the combination of Soviet defensive planning and German lack of concentration of force. German armor was committed piecemeal rather than in strength, and often without sufficient infantry support.Soviet defensive preparation was also a major factor. The Central Front under Marshal Rokossovskiy had correctly anticipated the likely areas of German attack and had fortified those areas very heavily, holding other areas more thinly. The 13th Army, which bore the brunt of the German attack, was far stronger in men and anti-tank guns than the other Central Front units, and indeed held the strongest defensive positions in the entire salient.

A major planning error by the Soviet Supreme High Command and the General Staff was their expectation that the main weight of the German attack would come in the north on the Central Front, causing them to concentrate more strength there. Also, the Central Front chose to defend the tactical zone (to a depth of 20 km) very heavily, leaving far fewer units in the depths of the defense. Model's army had fewer tanks than Manstein had in the south, and the German 9th Army also committed major units piecemeal due to some disruption caused by the Soviet pre-emptive artillery barrage. Finally, the 9th Army led with reinforced infantry divisions that were already in the line facing the Red Army, rather than attacking with uncommitted units.

Review of attack frontages and depth of German penetration shows clearly that the Red Army defensive tactics were succeeding. Beginning with a 45-kilometer-wide attack frontage on 5 July, the next day, the German 9th Army attacked on a 40-kilometer front. This dropped to 15 kilometers wide by 7 July, and only 2 kilometers on 8–9 July. Each day, the depth of the German advance slowed: 5 kilometers on the first day, 4 on the second, never more than 2 km each succeeding day. By 10 July, the 9th Army had been stopped in its tracks.

A great deal of the Soviet defensive success was down to its method of fire control, known to the Germans as Pakfront. This relied upon a group of 10 or more anti-tank guns under a single commander, which would fire at a single target at a time. These positions were protected with heavy concentrations of mortar and machine-gun nests, which were ordered to fire on German infantry only.

On 12 July, Zhukov ordered Operation Kutuzov. Powerful Soviet forces, including the 3rd Tank Army and the Soviet 11th Guards Army, broke through the weak German lines to the north of the Orel bulge. The flank of the German 9th and 2nd Panzer Armies were dangerously exposed.

The end in the north

The 9th Army had to withdraw, and did so through the window of opportunity created for them by the Luftwaffe. Their part in the offensive was over. Because the German armor was not concentrated and used with the same intensity as in the South, the German armor losses were comparatively light – 143 armored vehicles were total losses between 5 and 14 July.^[58] However, this failed to keep up with the steady influx of new soldiers and matériel for the Red Army. Few Red Army guns were captured, and those Red Army units that did retreat did so on orders. The German attack had nearly broken through the main Soviet defence zones, but stalled. The Soviet counter-offensive compelled Model to withdraw or risk the destruction of both German Armies.

Southern ground battle

A Waffen-SS Tiger I engages enemy armor. The Tiger's advanced optics and accurate main gun allowed it to effectively hit targets at extended ranges. The crew of a Pz.Kpfw. III tank assigned to the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich rest after heavy fighting near Belgorod.

In the south, the Voronezh Front fared less well against the 4th Panzer Army with its LII Corps, XLVIII Panzer Corps and II SS Panzer Corps. The II SS Panzer Corps attacked on a narrower frontage against two Red Army rifle regiments. The armored spearhead of Hoth's 4th Panzer Army forced its way forward, and by 6 July, had reached some 15 km past the lines. Again, Red Army planning played a big role. In the south, the Red Army had not been able to pinpoint the German attack sectors; this forced them to spread out their defenses more evenly. For example, three of the four armies of the Voronezh Front had about 10 antitank guns per kilometer of front; this contrasts sharply with the Central Front's distribution of guns, which was twice as heavy in the active sectors. Also, the Voronezh Front made the decision to hold the tactical zone much more thinly, leaving a much higher proportion of units in deeper positions compared to the Central Front. Finally, the Voronezh Front was weaker than the Central Front, yet it faced much stronger German forces. The German forces made steady progress, but, as in the north, attack frontages (width) and penetration depth tended to drop as the attack proceeded. The trend was not as marked as in the north, however. Beginning with a 30-kilometer-wide attack frontage on 5 July, this dropped to 20-kilometers wide by 7 July and 15 km by 9 July. Likewise, the depth of the penetration dropped from 9 km on 5 July to 5 km on 8 July and 2–3 km each day thereafter until the attack was cancelled. Red Army minefields and artillery were again successful in delaying the German attack and inflicting losses. The ability of dug-in Red Army units to delay the Germans was vital to allow their own reserves to be brought up into threatened sectors. Over 90,000 additional mines were laid during the operations by small mobile groups of engineers, generally working at night immediately in front of the expected German attack areas. There were no large-scale captures of prisoners nor any great loss of artillery, again indicating that Soviet units were giving ground in good order. German losses can be seen in the example of the Großdeutschland Division, which began the operation with 118 tanks. On 10 July, after five days of fighting, the division reported it had 3 Tigers, 6 Panthers, and 11 Pzkw-III and Pzkw-IV tanks operational. XLVIII Panzer Corps reported, overall, 38 Panthers operational with 131 awaiting repair, out of the 200 it started with on 5 July. Nevertheless, it was obvious that the threat of a German breakthrough in the south had to be reckoned with. The Steppe Front had been formed in the months prior to the operation as a central reserve for such an eventuality. Units of the Steppe Front began movement to the south as early as 9 July. This included the 5th Guards Tank Army and other combined-arms armies. The German flank, however, stood unprotected as the Red Army 7th Guards Army stalled Kempf's divisions, aided by heavy rain, after the Germans had crossed the Donets River. The 5th Guards Tank Army, reinforced with two additional tank corps, moved into positions to the east of Prokhorovka and had started to prepare a counterattack of their own when II SS Panzer Corps arrived. An intense struggle ensued. The Red Army managed to halt the SS—but only just. Little now stood in the way of the 4th Panzer Army, and a German breakthrough looked like a very real possibility. The Soviets therefore decided to deploy the rest of 5th Guards Tank Army.

Prokhorovka

Accounts of this battle remain shrouded in controversy and dispute. The original Soviet account of brave but reckless if ultimately successful mass Red Army assault on heavily armed German armour is now generally discounted; the most recent revisionist accounts suggest a complete Soviet debacle, with the Soviet charge on German armour being disrupted not by German tanks but fundamentally because so many T-34s fell down a Soviet anti-tank ditch.

On the morning of 12 July, Hoth, determined to push for a breakthrough, scraped together the available reserves of the 4th Panzer Army and advanced on Prokhorovka at the same time that the 5th Guards Tank Army launched a series of attacks as part of multi-front counteroffensive scheduled for 12 July and in an attempt to catch the Germans off balance. The SS and Guards units collided west of Prokhorovka in open country punctuated by farms, rolling hills and gullies. What happened next is open to debate with the release of new information from archives.

In stifling heat, an eight-hour battle began. The German units had 494 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces in the attack, with 90% operational. The men of the 5th Guards Tank Army had not yet been committed to battle, so they were fresh. The German force found itself heavily outnumbered. After the battle was over, the Soviets held the area, and were able to recover their disabled tanks and wounded crews.

The battle can best be described as a very costly tactical loss, but an operational draw for the Red Army. Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their missions that day.

The air battle was also intense: von Manstein had intended it to be the decisive blow against the Red Army forces, preventing a breakthrough to Oboyan and Kursk. The 5th Guards Tank Army had moved mainly at night, bringing 593 tanks and 37 self-propelled artillery pieces into position at Staryy Oskol. The Soviet had suffered bitter losses, and in this region the 2 Va could muster only 96 Strurmoviks, 266 fighters and 140 bombers. The 17 VA could muster just over 300 machines. 17 VA flew 893 sorties over this sector of the front, while VIII. Fliegerkorps flew 654. Strurmoviks from 291 ShAD attacked the II. SS Panzer Division throughout the day, causing significant damage to German armoured formations. Simultaneously, waves of Hs 129s and Ju 87s caused losses to the 69th Army and 5th Guards Army. Although Soviet tank losses are unknown, a report from the 29th Tank Corps reported "heavy losses in tanks through enemy aircraft and artillery". It also mentioned losses were so heavy that the advance had to be halted, and a switch to the defensive ordered. The Luftwaffe had complete air superiority over Prokhorovka, due to the VVS being concentrated over the flanks of the 4.Panzerarmee. However the Soviet 31 Guard Tank Corps, and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps fought the II SS Totenkopf to a standstill, employing the tactic of getting in close to German armour and attacking the vulnerable sides of the Tigers. The II SS was soon forced onto the defensive. Although the German formation held, it lost 50 percent of its armour in a prolonged engagement. By the night of 11-12 July, the only success the Germans had to show for their losses was a captured bridgehead over the Donets river at Rzavets. The LSSAH had been stopped by the Soviet 18 Tank Corps; III Panzerkorps and Das Reich were checked by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and two more Soviet reserve corps.

Tank losses have been a contentious subject ever since. Red Army losses have been stated to be as low as 200 or as high as 822 tanks, but the loss records now show about 300 complete losses, with a similar number damaged. Likewise, German losses have been reported to be as low as 80 or into the hundreds, including "dozens" of Tigers. This number is impossible to establish because of the German way of counting lost tanks. 60 to 70 German tanks are thought to have been total losses. In addition to total losses, an unknown number of tanks were damaged, many of which would have been lost in repair depots during the subsequent retreat as a consequence of the Red Army post-Kursk counteroffensive, Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev. Nipe puts the number of operational tank reductions in the whole corps at 70-80, but it is unclear how many of these would have been in short-term or long-term repair. In any event, the losses for both the II SS Panzer Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army in the “greatest tank battle of all time” fell short of the mythic proportions sometimes attributed to the Prokhorovka engagement.

The end in the south

Significantly, earlier in the operation, the attacking German units had been squeezed into ever-narrowing frontages by the defenders. Elite Red Army Guards Airborne units were holding firm on the flanks of the very narrow German penetration. The Germans could not squeeze many units into this narrow front, nor did they have the combat power to widen the penetration. Thus, as the attackers moved forward, they continually lost strength due to the need to hold their own flanks.

While the German offensive had been stopped in the north by 10 July, in the south the overall situation still hung in the balance, even after 12 July. German forces on the southern wing, exhausted and heavily depleted, had nevertheless breached the first two defensive belts and believed (wrongly) that they were about to break through the last belt. In fact at least five more defensive zones awaited them, although they were not as strong as the initial belts (and some of them did not have troops deployed). Red Army defenders had been weakened, and major parts of their reserve forces had been committed. Still, the available uncommitted Red Army reserves were far larger than the few available German reserves.

On 16 July, German forces withdrew to their start line. Severely depleted, the Germans then had to face Operation Rumyantsev, an offensive launched to smash the German forces in the Belgorod-Kharkov area on 3 August. Belogorod fell on the 5 August, and on 23 August, Kharkov fell, despite fierce resistance from German forces. With the capture of Kharkov, the Soviets considered the Battle of Kursk over.

Hitler cancels the operation

On the night of 9–10 July, the Western Allies mounted an amphibious invasion of Sicily. Three days later, Hitler summoned von Kluge and von Manstein to his Wolfsschanze headquarters in East Prussia and declared his intention to "temporarily" call off Operation Zitadelle. Von Manstein attempted to dissuade him, arguing that Zitadelle was on the brink of victory: "on no account should we let go of the enemy until the mobile reserves which he had committed were decisively beaten". In an unusual reversal of their roles, Hitler gave von Manstein a few more days to continue the offensive, but on 17 July, he ordered a withdrawal and cancelled the operation. He then ordered the entire SS Panzer Korps to be transferred to Italy.

Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the tactical battle has since been strongly criticized by German generals in their memoirs, and also by some historians. For example, it has been pointed out that the SS Panzer Korps would have taken three months to be transferred to Sicily, and thus could not possibly have affected the outcome there, while its contribution to the Kursk operation was vital.

In any event only one German division, 1st SS Panzer Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, departed for Italy, and without their equipment. The others remained behind to try to stem the Red Army counteroffensive launched in the wake of the failed German offensive.

 

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