Operation Market Garden

 

Waves of paratroopers land in the Netherlands during Operation Market Garden in September 1944.

Operation Market Garden (September 17–25, 1944) was an Allied military operation, fought in the Netherlands and Germany in World War II. It was the largest airborne operation of all time. It made large-scale use of airborne forces whose tactical objectives were to secure a series of bridges over the main rivers of the German-occupied Netherlands to allow a rapid advance by armoured units from the Dutch-Belgian border into northern Germany, across the Maas (Meuse) and two arms of the Rhine (the Waal and the Lower Rhine). This was intended to outflank the Siegfried Line and make possible an encirclement of the Ruhr Area, Germany's industrial heartland. The operation was initially successful with the capture of the Waal bridge at Nijmegen on September 20, but it was a failure overall since the planned Allied advance across the Rhine at Arnhem had to be abandoned. The British 1st Airborne Division did not secure the bridge at Arnhem, and although they managed to hold out near the bridge far longer than planned, the British XXX Corps failed to relieve them. The Rhine remained a barrier to the Allied advance for six additional months, until the offensives at Remagen, Oppenheim, Rees and Wesel in March 1945. Due to the Allied defeat at Arnhem, the north of the Netherlands could not be liberated before winter and the Hongerwinter ('Hungerwinter') took tens of thousands of lives, particularly in the cities of the Randstad area

Background

After major defeats in Normandy in July to August 1944, remnants of German forces withdrew across the Low Countries and eastern France towards the German border by the end of August. In the north in the first week of September, the British 21st Army Group under Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery was advancing on a line running from Antwerp to the northern border of Belgium with its British Second Army under Lieutenant-General Sir Miles Dempsey while its First Canadian Army under Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar had commenced its task of recapturing the ports of Dieppe, Le Havre and Boulogne-sur-Mer. To the south, the U.S. 12th Army Group under Lieutenant General Omar Bradley was nearing the German border and had been ordered to orient on the Aachen gap with Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges' U.S. First Army in support of Montgomery's advance on the Ruhr, while its U.S. Third Army under Lieutenant General George S. Patton moved eastward towards the Saar. The U.S. 6th Army Group under General Jacob L. Devers was advancing towards Germany after their landings in southern France.

Logistics

As the Allied pursuit across France and Belgium continued, fuel consumption soared. By 28 August the Communications Zone could no longer guarantee fuel deliveries and both the US First and Third Armies reported less than a day's supply on hand. Supply sources were limited to the original invasion beaches, the nearby deep water port of Cherbourg at the tip of the Cotentin peninsula and some minor ports in Normandy. The massive port of Antwerp was captured by Montgomery's troops on September 4,but the Scheldt estuary leading to it was still under German control. Other important ports on the English Channel coast such as Dunkirk remained in German hands until May 1945. Although over-the-beach supply operations outperformed expectations, September saw deteriorating weather and rising seas and the end of their usefulness was clearly in sight. Deep-water ports were therefore required. The Overlord plan had foreseen this, calling for the exploitation of ports in Brittany.[16] Eisenhower persisted with his plans to capture these ports but some argued that the capture of Le Havre and Antwerp made this necessary.For the time being, though, there were still enough supplies present on the continent to support Allied operations. It was a shortage of transport to move these supplies forward created a bottleneck. Advancing divisions US 12th Army Group left all their heavy artillery and half their medium artillery left west of the Seine, freeing their trucks to move supplies for other units. Four British truck companies were loaned to the Americans. Organisation of the Red Ball Express did much to lessen the impact of the transport shortage, but this ad hoc operation could not solve the problem.Railway transport was the most economical form of transport but the pre-invasion airstrikes had badly damaged the lines and the reconstruction effort could not keep pace. By the end of August, 18,000 men, including 5,000 prisoners of war, were engaged on railway construction projects. After many delays, the first trainload of supplies reached the US Third Army depot at Le Mans on 17 August. Fortunately, the system had not been nearly so badly damaged east of the Seine.The 21st Army Group stripped two of its divisions of their transport.On 30 August, the drastic step was taken to suspend imports entirely; 21st Army Group would draw on its reserves in Normandy until the ports of Dieppe and Boulogne-sur-Mer could be opened. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that 1,400 British three-ton trucks were found to be useless because of faulty pistons in their engines — they could have moved 800 tons per day, enough for two divisions.For Market Garden, The U.S. 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions would be maintained from British stocks for all common items such as food and fuel. Non-common items like ammunition, ordnance, and signal and engineer stores were delivered by the Red Ball Express or by rail to No. 6 Army Roadhead at Grammont. Three newly-arrived U.S. infantry divisions (the 26th, 95th, and 104th) were stripped of their transport, which was used to form provisional truck companies. These were assigned to the Red Ball Express, releasing eight companies to Red Lion, a special route to support Market-Garden. Red Lion convoys exceeded their target, delivering 650 tons per day instead of 500. Half of the tonnage hauled was supplies for the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions.

The "Red Ball Express" was an attempt to resolve persistent Allied supply problems.

Strategy

Following the British and Canadian breakout from Caen and the closure of the Falaise pocket, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, favoured pursuit of the seemingly shattered German armies eastwards to the Rhine on a broad front. While agreeing that Montgomery's drive towards the Ruhr should have priority, he still thought it was important to "get Patton moving again". To that end, in the first week of September 1944, Eisenhower authorised First Army to cross the Rhine near Cologne, Bonn and Koblenz while Third Army crossed near Mannheim, Mainz and Karlsruhe. Eisenhower relied on speed, which in turn depended on logistics, which he conceded were "stretched to the limit". This strategy was contested by his subordinates, particularly Montgomery, who argued that with the supply situation deteriorating, he would not be able to reach the Ruhr, but "a relocation of our present resources of every description would be adequate to get one thrust to Berlin".SHAEF did provide Montgomery with additional resources, principally additional locomotives and rolling stock, and priority for air supply.

Montgomery initially suggested Operation Comet, a limited airborne coup de main operation that was to be launched on September 2, 1944. Comet envisioned using the 1st Airborne Division, along with the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade, to secure several bridges over the River Rhine to aid the Allied advance into the North German Plain. The Divisional Headquarters for the 1st Airborne Division, along the 1st Airlanding Brigade and the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade were to land at Nijmegen, 1st Parachute Brigade was to land at Arnhem, and 4th Parachute Brigade was to land at Grave. However several days of poor weather and Montgomery's concerns over increasing levels of German resistance caused him to postpone the operation and then cancel it entirely on September 10.

Comet was replaced by a more ambitious plan to bypass the Siegfried Line by hooking around its northern end, allowing the Allies to cross the Rhine with large-scale forces, and trap the German Fifteenth Army between Arnhem and the shores of the IJsselmeer: Operation Market Garden. On September 10 Dempsey told Montgomery that he had doubts about this plan, and that he instead favored a strike north-eastwards between the Reichswald and the Ruhr to Wesel. Montgomery replied that he had just received a signal from London that something needed to be done to neutralise the V-2 launch sites around the Hague, which were bombarding London, and that the plan must therefore proceed. Montgomery flew to Brussels that afternoon to meet Eisenhower. Montgomery requested Eisenhower's Chief Administrative Officer to leave the meeting, but insisted on his own remaining. He then tore a file of Eisenhower's messages to shreds in front of him, and argued for a concentrated northern thrust, simultaneously demanding priority of supply. Eisenhower, convinced that German forces faced imminent collapse, was equally adamant that advance on a broad front was correct. However, he consented to Operation Market Garden, giving it "limited priority" in terms of supplies, but as part of his advance on a broad front. Eisenhower promised that allied aircraft and American trucks would deliver 1,000 tons of supplies per day. In vain, Montgomery complained about this to the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London, Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Nye.

Eisenhower's decision to launch Market Garden was influenced by his desire to keep the retreating Germans under pressure. However, he was also under pressure from the U.S. to use the Airborne Army as soon as possible.After Normandy the airborne forces had been withdrawn to reform in England, forming the First Allied Airborne Army of two British and three U.S. airborne divisions, and a Polish brigade. After Normandy, plans for eighteen airborne operations had been drafted, but then cancelled at short notice, mostly when Allied ground forces overran the intended drop zones.

Geography

Highway 69 (later nicknamed "Hell's Highway") leading through the planned route was two lanes wide, generally raised above the surrounding flat terrain of polder. The ground on either side of the highway was in places too soft to support tactical vehicle movement and there were numerous dykes and drainage ditches. Dykes tended to be topped by trees or large bushes and roads and paths were lined with trees. In early Autumn this meant that observation would be seriously restricted.There were six major water obstacles between the XXX Corps' jumping-off point and the objective of the north bank of the Nederrijn: the Wilhelmina Canal at Son (100 feet (30 m)); the Zuid-Willems Canal at Veghel (80 feet (24 m)); the Maas River at Grave (800 feet (240 m)); the Maas-Waal Canal (200 feet (61 m)); the Waal River at Nijmegen (850 feet (260 m)); and the Nederrijn at Arnhem (300 feet (91 m)). Plans were made to seize bridges across all these obstacles nearly simultaneously — any failure to do so could result in serious delay or even defeat. In case bridges were demolished by the Germans, XXX Corps had plans to to rebuild them. To this end, a vast quantity of bridging material was collected, along with 2,300 vehicles to carry it and 9,000 sappers to assemble it.The area is generally flat and open with less than a 30 feet (9.1 m) variation in altitude. There were two important hills, (300 feet (91 m)) high, that represented some of the highest ground in the Netherlands; one north and west of the Arnhem, and one in the 82nd Airborne Division's zone, Groesbeek ridge. Seizure and defence of this hill was considered vital to holding the highway bridges

Market

Market would employ four of the six divisions of the First Allied Airborne Army. The U.S. 101st Airborne Division, under Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, would drop in two locations just north of XXX Corps to take the bridges northwest of Eindhoven at Son and Veghel. The 82nd Airborne Division, under Brigadier General James M. Gavin, would drop northeast of them to take the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen, and the British 1st Airborne Division, under Major-General Roy Urquhart, and the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade would drop at the extreme north end of the route, to take the road bridge at Arnhem and rail bridge at Oosterbeek. The 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division would be flown to the captured Deelen Airfield on D+5.The First Allied Airborne Army had been created on August 16 as the end result of British requests for a coordinated headquarters for airborne operations, a concept approved by General Eisenhower on June 20. The British had strongly hinted that a British officer—Browning in particular—be appointed its commander. Since the bulk of both troops and aircraft were American, however, Brereton, a U.S. Army Air Forces officer was named by Eisenhower on July 16 and appointed by SHAEF on August 2. Brereton had no experience in airborne operations but had extensive command experience at the air force level in several theatres, most recently as commander of Ninth Air Force, which gave him a working knowledge of the operations of IX Troop Carrier Command.Market would be the largest airborne operation in history, delivering over 34,600 men of the 101st, 82nd, and 1st Airborne Divisions and the Polish Brigade. 14,589 troops were landed by glider and 20,011 by parachute. Gliders also brought in 1,736 vehicles and 263 artillery pieces. 3,342 tons of ammunition and other supplies were brought in by glider and parachute drop.To deliver its 36 battalions of airborne infantry and their support troops to the continent, the First Allied Airborne Army had under its operational control the 14 groups of IX Troop Carrier Command, and after September 11, the 16 squadrons of both 38 Group (an organization of converted bombers providing support to resistance groups) and a transport formation, 46 Group.The combined force had available 1,438 C-47/Dakota transports (1,274 USAAF and 164 RAF) and 321 converted RAF bombers. The Allied glider force had been rebuilt after Normandy until by September 16 it numbered 2,160 CG-4A Waco gliders, 916 Airspeed Horsas (812 RAF and 104 US Army), and 64 General Aircraft Hamilcars. However the U.S. had only 2,060 glider pilots available, so that none of its gliders would have a co-pilot but would instead carry an extra passenger.Because the C-47s served as both paratrooper transports and glider tugs, and because IX Troop Carrier Command would provide all the transports for both British parachute brigades, this massive force could deliver only 60% of the ground forces in a single lift. This limitation was the primary factor in the decision to split the troop lift schedule into successive days. Ninety percent of the USAAF transports on the first day would drop parachute troops, with the same proportion towing gliders on the second day (the RAF transports were almost entirely used for glider operations).September 17 was on a dark moon, and in the days following it, the new moon did not rise until dawn, the drops had to be made by daylight. Allied airborne doctrine prohibited large scale operations in the absence of all light, so the operation would have to be carried out in daylight. The risk of Luftwaffe interception was judged small, given the crushing air superiority of Allied fighters, but there were concerns about the increasing number of flak units in the Netherlands, especially around Arnhem. Brereton's experience with tactical air operations judged that flak suppression would be sufficient to permit the troop carriers to operate without prohibitive loss. Further, the invasion of Southern France had demonstrated that large scale daylight airborne operations were feasible.Daylight operations, in contrast to those in Sicily and Normandy, would have much greater navigational accuracy and time-compression of succeeding waves of aircraft, tripling the number of troops that could be delivered per hour. The time required to assemble airborne units on the drop zone after landing would be reduced by two-thirds.IX Troop Carrier Command's transport aircraft had both to tow gliders and drop paratroopers, duties that could not be performed simultaneously. Although every division commander requested two drops the first day, Brereton's staff scheduled only one lift based on the need to prepare for the first drop by bombarding German flak positions for half a day, and a weather forecast on the afternoon of September 16, (which soon proved erroneous), that the area would have clear conditions for four days, so allowing drops on these days.After one week preparations were declared complete; by comparison the planning and training for the airborne drops at Sicily and Normandy had taken months. One United States Air Force historian noted that Market was the only large airborne operation of World War II in which the USAAF "had no training program, no rehearsals, almost no exercises, and a...low level of tactical training."Gavin, commanding the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, was skeptical of the plan. In his diary he wrote, "It looks very rough. If I get through this one I will be very lucky." He was also highly critical of Browning, writing that he "...unquestionably lacks the standing, influence and judgment that comes from a proper troop experience... his staff was superficial... Why the British units fumble along... becomes more and more apparent. Their tops lack the know-how, never do they get down into the dirt and learn the hard way."

Garden

Garden consisted primarily of XXX Corps and was initially spearheaded by the Guards Armoured Division, with the 43rd Wessex and 50th Northumbrian Infantry Divisions in reserve. They were expected to arrive at the south end of the 101st Airborne Division's area on the firstday, the 82nd's by the second day and the 1st's by the fourth day at the latest. The airborne divisions would then join the XXX Corps in the breakout from the Arnhem bridgehead.Four days was a long time for an airborne force to fight unsupported. In addition the Allied paratroopers lacked adequate anti-tank weapons. Even so, before Operation Market Garden started it seemed to the Allied high command that the German resistance had broken. Most of the German Fifteenth Army in the area appeared to be fleeing from the Canadians and they were known to have no Panzergruppen. It was thought that XXX Corps would face limited resistance on their route up Highway 69 and little armour. Meanwhile, the German defenders would be spread out over 100 kilometres (62 mi) trying to contain the pockets of airborne forces, from the Second Army in the south to Arnhem in the north .

German preparation

The rout of the Wehrmacht during July and August led the Allies to believe that the German army was a spent force unable to reconstitute its shattered units, and this was not an unreasonable position to take. During those two months the Wehrmacht had suffered a string of defeats which had inflicted significant casualties on it. Between June 6 and August 14 it had suffered 23,019 killed in action, 198,616 missing or taken prisoner and 67,240 wounded. Many of the formations the Wehrmacht had possessed at the beginning of the Normandy campaign had either been annihilated or had been reduced to skeleton formations by the end of August. As the German armies had retreated towards the German frontier, they were often harried by air strikes and bombing raids by aircraft of the Royal Air Force and United States Army Air Force, inflicting casualties and destroying precious vehicles. Attempts to halt the Allied advance often seem fruitless, as hurried counter-attacks and blocking positions were brushed aside, and at times there seemed to be too few German units to hold any specific location.However, by early September this situation was beginning to change. The failure of the 21st Army Group to seal off the Scheldt Estuary area had allowed the 65,000 troops of the German Fifteenth Army to be extricated from the area, along with 225 guns and 750 trucks, via a flotilla of commandeered freighters, barges and small boats. From there they moved to the Netherlands.

German soldiers at Arnhem

Adolf Hitler began to take a personal interest in the apparent disintegration of Army Group B, which commanded all German forces in Normandy. On September 4 he recalled Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt from retirement, where he had been since Hitler had fired him as Wehrmacht Commander-in-Chief West on July 2, and reinstated him in his old position. He would replace Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, who had only assumed the position eighteen days prior and would now command only Army Group B. Rundstedt immediately began to plan a defence against what Wehrmacht intelligence said were 60 Allied divisions at full strength, although Eisenhower in fact possessed only 49 divisions.

Model set out to stymie the Allied advance. The 719th Infantry Division, part of LXXXVIII Corps, was dispatched southwards to the Albert Canal and Model requested reinforcements from Germany, stating that he would require twenty-five infantry divisions and six armoured divisions to hold; he envisioned a line stretching from Antwerp via Maastricht to Metz, and from there follow the line of the Albert Canal to the Meuse and the Siegfried Line. Meanwhile, Colonel General Kurt Student, commander of the Fallschirmjaeger, the German airborne forces, received orders from Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht to immediately move from his present location in Berlin and proceed to the Netherlands, where he would collect all available units and build a front near the Albert Canal, which was to be held at all costs. This front was to be held by the newly-formed First Parachute Army, a euphemistic name for what was essentially a paper formation. Its composite units were scattered throughout Germany and the Netherlands and consisted either of units in the process of being formed, or remnants cadred by survivors of previous units.

However, though the situation seemed dire, the German front was beginning to form into what Ian Kershaw terms 'a crust'. Effective leadership and initiative, combined with a good staff system, was beginning to create a coherent defence from what was previously organized chaos. On September 4 the 719th infantry division began to dig in along the Albert Canal, and was soon joined by forces under the command of Lieutenant General Kurt Chill. Although Chill only officially commanded the 85th Infantry Division, which had suffered heavy casualties during the retreat from Normandy, he had assumed command of the remnants of the 84th and 89th Infantry Divisions en route. Initially ordered to take his command to the Rhineland for rest and reinforcements, Chill disregarded the order and moved his forces to the Albert Canal, linking up with the 719th; he also had 'reception centres' set up at the bridges crossing the Albert Canal, where small groups of retreating troops were picked up and turned into 'ad hoc' units. By September 7 the 176th Infantry Division, a Kranken division composed of elderly men and men with various medical complaints, had arrived from the Siegfried Line, and elements of the First Parachute Army began to appear. At this stage the Army consisted of approximately seven Fallschirmjaeger regiments composed of some 20,000 airborne troops along with a collection of anti-aircraft batteries and a mix of 25 self-propelled guns and tank destroyers. Kriegsmarine and SS units were also allocated to Students command, and Hitler had promised Model 200 Panther tanks would be sent straight from the production lines; he also ordered all Tiger tanks, Jagdpanther self-propelled guns and 88 mm guns that were available in Germany be transferred to the West.

	Insignia of 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg

On 5 September, Model's forces were bolstered by the arrival of the II SS Panzer Corps, which consisted of the 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer division under the command of Lieutenant General Wilhelm Bittrich. The Corps had been reduced to approximately 6,000-7,000 men, some 20-30% of its original strength due to it having been in continuous action since late June; losses in officers and NCOs had been especially high. Accordingly Model ordered the two divisions to rest and refit in designated 'safe' areas behind the new German line; these areas coincidentally happened to be Eindhoven and Arnhem. The 10th SS Panzer Division was to be restored to full strength in order to provide an active armoured reserve, and as such the 9th SS Panzer Division was ordered to transfer all of its heavy equipment, including vehicles, to its sister division; it was intended that the 9th would then be transported to Germany for replenishment. At the time of Operation Market-Garden 10th SS Panzer Division had an approximate strength of 3,000 men comprising of an armoured infantry regiment, divisional reconnaissance battalion, two artillery battalions and an engineer battalion, all partially motorized. Other formations were appearing to strengthen the German defences. Between September 16 and 17 two infantry divisions from Fifteenth Army assembled in Brabant, understrength but well-equipped and able to act as a reserve. Near Eindhoven and Arnhem, a number of scratch formations were being assembled. Several SS units, including an NCO training battalion and a panzergrenadier reserve battalion, were being prepared to enter combat, and Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine personnel were being grouped into Fliegerhorst and Schiffstammabteilung formations respectively. There were also a number of training battalions that were being equipped, several depot battalions from the Hermann Goering Panzer Division, and various artillery, anti-aircraft and field police units scattered throughout northern Holland.

Intelligence

German Both von Rundstedt and Model expected a major Allied offensive to be launched at any moment due to the large number of intelligence reports they were receiving that referred to a 'constant stream' of reinforcements being allocated to the right wing of the British Second Army. The senior intelligence officer of Army Group B believed that the Second Army would launch an offensive in the direction of Nijmegen, Arnhem and Wesel with its primary objective to reach and bridge the Ruhr river. He was convinced that airborne troops would be used to support this offensive, but was unsure as to where they would be deployed, suspecting areas of the Siegfried Line, north of Aachen or possibly even near the Saar. Second Army would assemble its units at the Mass-Scheldt and Albert Canals. The right wing of the Army would be the assault force, comprised primarily of armoured units, which would force a crossing of the Maas and attempt to break through to the Ruhr industrial area near Roermond. The left wing would cover the Army's northern flank by moving up to the Waal near Nijmegen and isolating the German 15th Army situated on the Dutch coast.

Allied

A number of reports about German troop movements reached Allied high command, including details about the identity and location of German armoured formations. Station X at Bletchley Park monitored and decrypted German ULTRA intelligence reports and sent them to senior Allied commanders, but they only reached army headquarters level and were not passed down any lower. On 16 September ULTRA decrypts revealed the movement of 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer division to Nijmegen and Arnhem, creating enough concern for Eisenhower to send his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, to raise the issue with Montgomery on 10 September; however, Montgomery dismissed Smith's concerns and refused to alter the plans for the landing of 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem. Further information about the location of the German Panzer Divisions at Arnhem was revealed by aerial photographs of Arnhem taken by an RAF reconnaissance flight, as well as information from members of the Dutch resistance. Fearing that 1st Airborne Division might be in grave danger if it landed at Arnhem, the chief intelligence officer of the division, Major Brian Urquhart, arranged a meeting with Browning and informed him of the armour present at Arnhem. However Browning dismissed his claims and ordered the division's senior medical officer to send Urquhart in sick leave on account of 'nervous strain and exhaustion.'

Battle

Day 1: Sunday, September 17, 1944

The 82nd Airborne Division drops near Grave (National Archives)

Operation Market Garden opened with Allied success all around. In the first landing, almost all troops arrived on top of their drop zones without incident. In the 82nd Airborne Division, 89% of troops landed on or within 1,000 meters (1,094 yards) of their correct drop zones, and 84% of gliders landed on or within 1,000 meters (1,094 yards) of their landing zones. This contrasted with previous operations where night drops had resulted in units being scattered by up to 19 km (12 miles). Losses to enemy aircraft and flak were light; German flak was described in reports as "heavy but inaccurate". In the south the 101st met little resistance and captured four of five bridges. The bridge at Son was blown up as they approached it, after being delayed by a short engagement with a German Flak 88 mm Anti-aircraft gun and a machine gun. Later that day several small attacks by the German 59th Infantry Division (a 15th Army unit that had escaped across the South Beveland isthmus because of the failure of XXX Corps to seal it off) were beaten off, while small units of the 101st had moved south of Son.

To their north the 82nd arrived, and the small group dropped near Grave took the bridge in a rush. They also succeeded in capturing one of the vitally important bridges over the Maas-Waal canal, the lock-bridge at Heumen. The main effort of the 82nd was to seize the Groesbeek Heights and set up a blocking position there, to prevent a German armour attack out of the nearby Reichswald (a forest in Germany, near the border) and to deny the Heights to German artillery observers. Both Gavin and Browning felt this must be the Division's priority. The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment was tasked with taking the 600 meters (656 yards) long Nijmegen highway bridge if possible, but because of miscommunication they did not start until late in the day. Had they attacked earlier they would have faced only a dozen Germans. By the time the 508th attacked, troops of the 9th SS Reconnaissance Battalion were arriving. The attack was stopped, leaving the Nijmegen bridge in German hands.This was vital. Unlike some of the bridges to the south, which were over smaller rivers and canals that could be bridged by engineering units, the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges crossed two arms of the Rhine that could not be bridged easily. If either of the Nijmegen or Arnhem bridges were not captured and held, the advance of XXX Corps would be blocked and Operation Market Garden would fail.

Allied Landings near Nijmegen

British landings

British 1st Parachute Battalion at Arnhem

The 1st Airborne Division landed without major incident, but problems associated with the poor plan began almost immediately. Only half of the Division arrived with the First Lift, and only half of these, the 1st Parachute Brigade, could advance on the bridge. The remaining troops had to defend the drop zones overnight awaiting the arrival of the Second Lift on the following day. Thus the Division's primary objective had to be tackled by less than a half brigade. While the paratroopers marched eastwards to Arnhem, the Reconnaissance Squadron was to race to the bridge in their jeeps and hold it until the rest of the Brigade arrived. The unit set off to the bridge late, and having travelled only a short distance the vanguard was halted by a strong German defensive position; the squadron could make no further progress.This had grave consequences. Five hours after the initial landing, feeling that the British were tied down in Arnhem, the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 9th Waffen-SS Panzer Division was able to cross the Arnhem bridge and drive to Nijmegen and the bridge over the Waal branch of the Rhine. No British airborne unit was at this bridge.Two of the three battalions of the 1st Parachute Brigade were slowed down by small German units of a training battalion which had quickly established a thin blocking line covering the obvious routes into Arnhem. Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost's 2nd Battalion, which was advancing eastwards along the southernmost road into Arnhem, near the Rhine, found its route largely undefended. They arrived at the bridge in the evening and set up defensive positions at the north end. Two attempts to capture the arched steel bridge and its southern approach were unsuccessful. Of the other battalions, the 3rd had only covered half the distance to the bridge when they halted for the night, the rear of their column being under attack and needing time to catch up. The 1st Battalion was similarly fragmented, yet pushed on around the flank of the German line throughout the night. Frequent skirmishes resulted in their making little more progress.

Communication breakdown

Some loss of communication between the bridge and Divisional Headquarters in one of the drop zones was expected, because 13 km (8 miles) separated them and the main radio used throughout the Division was the Type 22 set designed to have an effective range of just 5 km (3 miles). However, the British radios did not function at any range; some had difficulty receiving signals from just a few hundred meters and others received nothing at all. Moreover it was found after landing that the radios had been pre-set to different frequencies, two of which coincided with those of German and British public broadcasting stations. Other theories have been advanced to explain the greatly reduced range of the 1st Airborne Division's radio sets. Modern tests using Type 22 sets have suggested that large deposits of iron in the soil could have been to blame. It is also possible that repeated operational stand-bys and cancellations (over a dozen drops were planned and then cancelled in the weeks prior to the operation) had led to sloppy battery charging procedures and lax supervision of this task. Thus communication between 1st Airborne units was poor while German defences were being coordinated and reinforced.The only means of calling for close air support was through two special American units dropped with the 1st Airborne Division. These units were equipped with "Veeps": jeeps having Very High Frequency SCR-193 crystal sets. It was found impossible to communicate with aircraft on the higher of two frequencies allocated for this purpose, and the sets could not be tuned to the lower frequency. Despite efforts to re-tune them, the sets were soon destroyed by mortar fire, cutting the 1st Airborne's only possible link with RAF fighter-bombers. The pilots were under orders not to attack on their own initiative since from the air there was no easy way to distinguish friend from foe. Together with poor weather, this led to a critical lack of air support.

John Dutton Frost

XXX Corps advance

On the morning of September 17 Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks was given confirmation that the operation was to take place that day. At 1230 hours Horrocks received a signal that the first wave of the airborne forces had left their bases within the United Kingdom and set the time for the ground attack to start at 1435 hours. At 1415 hours 300 guns of the Corps artillery opened fire, firing a rolling barrage in front of XXX Corps start line that was 1 mile (1.6 km) wide and 5 miles (8.0 km) in depth. The barrage was supported by seven squadrons of RAF Hawker Typhoons firing rockets at all known German positions along the road to Valkenswaard.The advance was led by tanks and infantry of the Irish Guards and started on time when Lieutenant Keith Heathcote, commanding the lead tank, ordered his driver to advance. The lead units of the Irish Guards Group had broken out of XXX Corps bridgehead on the Meuse-Escaut canal and crossed into the Netherlands by 1500 hours. After crossing the border the Irish Guards were ambushed by infantry and anti-tank guns dug in on both sides of the main road.Portions of the artillery barrage was refired and fresh waves of Hawker Typhoons were called in. The Guardsmen moved forward to clear the German positions, manned by elements from two German parachute battalions and two battalions of the 9th SS Division, and soon routed the German forces flanking the road. Interrogation of captured German soldiers led to some of them willingly, others after being threatened, pointing out the remaining German positions. The fighting soon died down and the advance resumed. By last light the town of Valkenswaard had been reached and occupied the Irish Guards Group.

Horrocks had expected that the Irish Guards would have been able to advance the 13 miles (21 km) to Eindhoven within two-three hours, however they had only covered 7 miles (11 km). The operation was already starting to fall behind schedule. In Valkenswaard engineers were moved up to construct a 190 foot (58 m) Class 40 Bailey bridge over a stream, which was completed within 12 hours.

German reactions

On the German side, it was soon clear what was happening. Field Marshal Walter Model was staying at the Tafelberg Hotel in Oosterbeek, a village to the west of Arnhem, when the British began to land in the countryside to the west of Oosterbeek. Initially confused, he concluded that they were commandos attempting to kidnap him. He made a mad dash for a safer location. Meanwhile, Wilhelm Bittrich, commanding the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, had a clearer head and immediately sent a reconnaissance company of the 9th SS Panzer Division to Nijmegen to reinforce the bridge defences. By midnight, however, Model had gained a clear picture of the situation and issued orders that proved beneficial to the successful defence of Arnhem. The confusion usually attendant upon defending against airborne operations was absent at Arnhem, and the advantage of surprise was largely nullified by an alert reaction.

Day 2: Monday, September 18

Allied weather forecasters correctly predicted that England would be covered in fog on the morning of September 18. The Second Lift was postponed three hours as a result, and thick low clouds began to develop over the southern part of the battle zone that spread during the day over the entire area, hampering both resupply and air support missions. (Seven of the next eight days had poor weather, and all air operations were cancelled on September 22 and September 24.)

1st Airborne zone

British landings in Arnhem

The 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions pushed towards the Arnhem bridge during the early hours of September 18 and made good progress, but they were frequently halted in skirmishes as soon as it became light. With their long and unwieldy columns having to halt to beat off attacks whilst the troops in front carried on unaware, the Germans would delay segments of the two battalions, fragment them, and mop up the remnants.Early in the day the 9th SS Reconnaissance Battalion, sent south the day before, concluded it was not needed in Nijmegen and returned to Arnhem. Though aware of the British troops at the bridge, it attempted to cross by force and was beaten back with heavy losses, including its commanding officer, SS-Hauptsturmführer Gräbner.By the end of the day the 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions had entered Arnhem, and were within 2 km (1 mile) of the bridge with approximately 200 men, one-sixth their original strength. Most of the officers and non-commissioned officers had been killed, wounded, or captured. The Second Lift, delayed by fog and jumping onto a landing zone under heavy attack, landed at full strength (the 4th Parachute Brigade, consisting of the 10th, 11th and 156th Battalions of the Parachute Regiment, commanded by Brigadier-General John Winthrop Hackett) and C and D Companies of the 2nd South Staffordshire Regiment.

82nd Airborne zone

Grave proved to be well defended, and German forces continued to press on the 82nd deployed on the Groesbeek heights to the east of Nijmegen. The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment defended successfully against German attacks in Horst, Grafwegen, and Riethorst. Early in the day, German counterattacks seized one of the Allied landing zones, where the Second Lift was scheduled to arrive at 13:00. The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment attacked at 13:10 and cleared the LZ by 14:00, capturing 16 German flak pieces and 149 prisoners. Delayed by weather in Britain, the Second Lift did not arrive until 15:30. This lift brought in elements of the 319th and 320th Glider Field Artillery battalions, the 456th Parachute Field Artillery battalion, and medical support elements. Twenty minutes later, 135 B-24 bombers dropped supplies from low level (100 ), 80% of which were recovered.

101st Airborne zone

Faced with the loss of the bridge at Son, the 101st unsuccessfully attempted to capture a similar bridge a few kilometers away at Best, finding the approach blocked. Other units continued moving to the south and eventually reached the northern end of Eindhoven. At about noon they were met by reconnaissance units from XXX Corps. At 16:00 they made radio contact with the main force to the south and told them about the Son bridge, asking for a Bailey bridge to be brought forward. XXX Corps passed through Eindhoven and bivouacked south of Son, where they waited for the Royal Engineers to erect the Bailey bridge.

At the end of two days the XXX Corps advance was behind schedule, and the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges were still in German hands.

Day 3: Tuesday, September 19

Arnhem

During the early morning hours the 1st Parachute Brigade began its attack towards Arnhem Bridge with the 1st Battalion leading, supported by remnants of the 3rd Battalion, with the 2nd South Staffordshires on the 1st Battalion's left flank and the 11th Battalion following behind. As soon as it became light the 1st Battalion was spotted, and halted by fire from the main German defensive line. Trapped in open ground and under heavy fire from three sides, the 1st Battalion disintegrated and what remained of the 3rd Battalion fell back. The 2nd South Staffordshires were similarly cut off and, save for about 150 men, overcome by midday. The 11th Battalion, which had stayed out of much of the fighting, was now overwhelmed in exposed positions while attempting to capture high ground to the north. With no hope of breaking through, the 500 remaining men of these four battalions withdrew westwards in the direction of the main force, 5 km (3 miles) away in Oosterbeek.

The 2nd Battalion and attached units, by now amounting to approximately 600 men, were still in firm control of the northern approach ramp to the Arnhem bridge. The Germans recognised that they would not be moved by infantry attacks such as those that had been bloodily repulsed on the previous day, so instead they heavily shelled the short British perimeter with mortars, artillery, and tanks, systematically demolishing each house to enable their infantry to exploit gaps and dislodge the defenders. Although in constant, heavy battle against enormous odds, the British clung fiercely to their positions and the perimeter remained largely unaltered.

Oosterbeek

To the north of Oosterbeek the 4th Parachute Brigade led an attempt by the 1st Airborne Division to break through the German lines, but communication difficulties and significant enemy resistance caused the attack to fail with heavy losses. The Division, scattered far and wide and hard pressed by the enemy on all sides, had lost its offensive capability. Unable to help Lt.-Col. Frost at the bridge, the remaining soldiers attempted to withdraw into a defensive pocket at Oosterbeek and hold a bridgehead on the north bank of the Rhine. The parachute elements of the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade had remained in England because of dense fog. Their gliders, however, mainly carrying anti-tank guns and vehicles, were able to take off but had the misfortune to arrive above the landing zone just as the 4th Parachute Brigade was retreating across it, and the gliders came under fire from German units pursuing the Brigade.

British paratroopers in Oosterbeek

Nijmegen

At 08:20, the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment made contact with XXX Corps at Grave. This enabled the Regiment to move on to other missions and place the 3rd Battalion in division reserve. By the afternoon of September 19, advance units of XXX Corps were arriving in Nijmegen. By this time, according to the original plan, they were due in Arnhem. A combined effort to take the Nijmegen bridge was mounted by two companies from the Guards Armoured Division and the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment. The attack got within 400 meters (400 yards) of the bridge before being stopped; skirmishing continued throughout the night. A plan was developed to attack the south end of the bridge again while the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, planned to cross the river in boats 2 km (1 mile) downstream and then attack the north end. The boats, requested for late afternoon, never arrived. Once again XXX Corps was held up in front of a bridge.

The 1st and 5th battalions, Coldstream Guards, were attached to the division. A resupply attempt by 35 C-47s (out of 60 sent) was unsuccessful; the supplies were dropped from a high altitude and could not be recovered. Bad weather over English bases prevented the scheduled major glider mission carrying the 325th Gilder Infantry Regiment from taking off, ending any hope for timely reinforcement for the 82nd Airborne.

Wijchen

At 09:50 the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment was going forward to Wijchen, to attack the Edithbridge from its south end. The bridge was secured. After this fierce engagement they pushed on to the traffic bridge south of Wijchen. Another fierce engagement followed, and this bridge too was secured.

Eindhoven-Veghel

To their south, units of the 101st sent to take Best the day before were forced to yield to German counterattacks during the morning. British tanks arriving during the day helped push back the Germans by late afternoon. Later a small force of Panther tanks arrived at Son and started firing on the Bailey bridge. These too were beaten back by anti-tank guns that had recently landed, and the bridge was secured.

Day 4: Wednesday, September 20

Arnhem bridge

Lt. Colonel John Frost's force at the bridge continued to hold out and established communication via the public telephone system with 1st Division at around noon, to learn that the division had no hope of relieving them and that XXX Corps was stopped to the south in front of Nijmegen bridge. By the afternoon the British positions around the north end of Arnhem bridge had weakened considerably. Casualties, mostly wounded, were high from constant shelling. An acute lack of ammunition, especially anti-tank munitions, enabled enemy armour to demolish British positions from point-blank range. Food, water, and medical supplies were scarce, and so many buildings were on fire and in such serious danger of collapse that a two-hour truce was arranged to evacuate the wounded (including Lieutenant-Colonel Frost) into German care and captivity. Frederick Gough took over as commander when Frost left.

British POW's at Arnhem

The Germans overcame remaining pockets of resistance throughout the day, gaining control of the northern bridge approaches and permitting reinforcements to cross the span and reinforce units further south near Nijmegen. The remaining British troops continued to fight on fiercely, some with just fighting knives, but by early Thursday morning almost all had been taken prisoner. The last radio message broadcast from the bridge - "Out of ammo, God save the King" - was heard only by German radio intercept operators. While it was estimated that the entire 1st Airborne Division, 10,000 strong, would only need to hold the Arnhem bridge for two days, in fact just 740 had held it for twice as long against far heavier opposition than anticipated. While 81 British soldiers died defending Arnhem bridge, German losses cannot be stated with any accuracy, though they were certainly extremely heavy; 11 units known to have participated in the fighting reported 50% casualties after the battle. In memory of the fighting there, the bridge has been renamed the "John Frost Bridge".

Oosterbeek

Further west, the remnants of the 1st Airborne Division were gathering at Oosterbeek for their last stand; those already in place were not seriously challenged by the enemy throughout the day. To the east of the village, the 1st, 3rd and 11th Parachute Battalions and 2nd South Staffordshires were organised into a defensive position, and in desperate fighting later in the day they bloodily repulsed an enemy attack which threatened to cut the division off from the Rhine and so seal the fate of their fragile bridgehead.In the woods to the west of Oosterbeek, the 4th Parachute Brigade was fighting its way towards the divisional perimeter but was under severe attack from German troops, supported by artillery, mortars, and tanks (some mounting flame-throwers). Their casualties were heavy; the 10th Battalion reached Oosterbeek in the early afternoon but with only 60 men.Further in the rear, the 156th Parachute Battalion was being more hard pressed and was forced to fight off numerous enemy attacks before mounting counter-attacks of their own; indeed it is a credit to the battalion that they were so successful in these respects that the Germans did not know they were fighting men who were in full retreat. The battalion, down to 150 men, mounted a desperate bayonet charge to capture a hollow in the ground in the woods, in which they remained pinned by enemy attacks for the next eight hours. Towards the end of the day the 75 men who could, fixed bayonets and made a highly successful break through the German lines, and so retreated into the Allied pocket at Oosterbeek.

Nijmegen

Boats ordered by the 82nd Airborne the day before failed to arrive until afternoon, and a hasty daylight assault crossing was ordered. At about 15:00 the 3rd Battalion, 504th PIR, made the crossing in 26 canvas assault boats into well-defended positions. The American unit had no training on the British-made boats. A shortage of paddles required some troopers to paddle the craft with rifle butts. About half the boats survived the crossing under heavy fire; survivors then assaulted across 200 meters (200 yards) of open ground on the far bank and seized the north end of the bridge. German forces withdrew from both ends of the bridge, which was then rushed by Guards tanks and the 2nd Battalion, 505th PIR, securing the bridge after four days of struggle. The costly attack was nicknamed "Little Omaha" in reference to Omaha Beach.To the east, German attacks on the heights made significant progress, capturing the only remaining bridge suitable for tanks. A counterattack at Mook by elements of the 505th PIR and 4th Battalion, the Coldstream Guards, forced the Germans back to their line of departure by 20:00. However, the 508th PIR lost ground at Im Thal and Legewald when attacked by German infantry and tanks. By now it was evident that the Germans' plan was to cut the highway, which would split up the Airborne units and cut off the advance elements of XXX Corps.To the south the running battles between the 101st and various German units continued. Eventually several Panther tanks managed to cut the roads, but pulled back when low on ammunition.When Lieutenant-General Dempsey of the Second Army met Brigadier General Gavin, commander of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, he is reported to have said (in reference to the Nijmegen attack), "I am proud to meet the commander of the greatest Division in the world today."

British tanks of XXX Corps cross the road bridge at Nijmegen

Day 5: Thursday, September 21

Oosterbeek

British paras at Oosterbeek search Dutch school for German snipers.

Approximately 3,584 survivors of the 1st Airborne Division established themselves in the buildings and woods around Oosterbeek with the intention of holding a bridgehead on the north side of the Rhine until XXX Corps could arrive. Throughout the day their position was heavily attacked on all sides. In the southeast the Lonsdale Force (the remnants of the 1st, 3rd, and 11th Parachute Battalions and 2nd South Staffordshires) repulsed a major attack aided by the fire of the divisional light artillery. In the north the 7th King's Own Scottish Borderers were almost overrun during the afternoon, but a counterattack with bayonets restored the situation and the heavily depleted battalion moved further south to occupy a narrower front. The most serious attack of the day was made at dawn against "B" Company, 1st Battalion, Border Regiment, which controlled a vital area of high ground in the southwestern tip of the perimeter overlooking the Heveadorp ferry crossing at Driel, which was the division's only straightforward means of receiving reinforcements from the south. The company was attacked by enemy armour and infantry, using captured French tanks equipped with flamethrowers, and the heights were lost. Counterattacks failed and the remnants of the company were redeployed. The division was left in a precarious position, controlling just 700 meters (700 yards) of the riverbank. The division refused to yield ground to similar attacks elsewhere on their front. A resupply attempt by RAF Stirlings of 38 Group was disrupted by the only effective Luftwaffe fighter interception during the entire operation. Fw 190s intercepted the Stirlings at low altitude and shot down 7 of one line of 10, and 15 overall. Anti-aircraft fire accounted for 8 further losses. The Fw 190s were able to penetrate the screen of Allied fighters sent to cover the drop when one group, the U.S. 56th Fighter Group, was late in arriving in its patrol sector between Lochem and Deventer. The 56th, however, did redeem itself to an extent by shooting down 15 of the 22 Fw 190s as they departed the area.

Polish paratroopers enter the battle

After two days of weather-related delay, the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade under Major-General Stanislaw Sosabowski finally entered the battle on the afternoon of September 21, delivered at about 17:15 by 114 C-47s of the U.S. 61st and 314th Troop Carrier Groups. Two of the brigade's three battalions were dropped amidst heavy German fire, opposite the 1st Airborne Division's position on a new drop zone south of the Rhine near the village of Driel. Poor coordination by the RAF and persistent attacks by Luftwaffe aircraft caused their supplies to be dropped 15 km (9 miles) away, on the opposite side of the Rhine.Planning to use the Heveadorp ferry to reinforce the division, they soon discovered that the opposite bank was dominated by the enemy and that the ferry was missing; it was later found downstream past the road bridge, unserviceable. Unable to help the British, the Polish withdrew to Driel for the night. The 1st Airborne Division made radio contact during the day with guns of the 64th Medium Regiment of XXX Corps Artillery which had advanced with the ground forces and were assigned to provide the division with artillery support. Unlike many others, this radio link endured throughout the battle and the regiment provided valuable fire support to the division.

Polish Paratroopers in positions on the southern bank of the Rhine

Nijmegen

Despite the capture of Nijmegen bridge and the clearing of the town on the previous evening, the Guards Armoured Division did not begin to advance until some 18 hours later, at noon. Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks claimed he needed this delay to sort out the confusion among his troops that had resulted from the battle in Nijmegen. This was a controversial decision that has been examined often in the years since. Half of the division had been detached to assist the 82nd Airborne Division elsewhere as the Germans sought to cut off the tip of the advance. The remainder of the Guards Armoured Division was short of fuel and exhausted from its difficult fight to secure Nijmegen. The Market/Garden plan depended upon a single highway as the route of advance and resupply. This imposed a delay since other units could not be deployed on alternate routes to sustain the forward momentum. Brigadier General Gavin's diary comment was: "Had Ridgway been in command at that moment, we would have been ordered up that road in spite of all our difficulties, to save the men at Arnhem." The historian Max Hastings wrote "It reflected poorly on the British Army...".The delay enabled the Germans to considerably shore up their defences to the south of Arnhem, aided by use of the bridge following their capture of its northern end. The advance of the Guards, hindered by marshes that prevented off-road movement, was soon halted by a firm German defensive line. The Guards not having the strength to outflank it, the 43rd Division was ordered to take over the lead, work its way around the enemy positions and make contact with the Polish at Driel. However, the 43rd was 30 km (20 miles) away and there was a traffic jam between it and Nijmegen. It was not until the following day, Friday, that the whole division finally crossed the River Waal and began its advance.The Germans, clearly starting to gain the upper hand, continued their counterattacks all along the path of XXX Corps, although the Corps still managed to advance and the 101st Airborne Division continued to exploit its gains.At about 15:00, 406 C-47 glider tugs and 33 C-47 cargo carriers executed a resupply mission for the 82nd Airborne Division. About 60% of the supplies were recovered (351 of the gliders were counted effective), partly with the help of Dutch civilians. Most of the 82nd and 101st, reinforced with British armour units, were engaged in defensive missions with the objective of holding the highway corridor. Small attacks were fought all along the corridor.

Wijchen bridge

After the victory of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment at Wijchen the Germans tried to attack the Edithbridge from the north end. The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment requested the 101st Airborne Division for help. Advancing directly, they couldn't get close enough to the Germans. It looked like another failure to secure the bridge. But the 101st then headed into Wijchen. Ultimately the Germans were not strong enough to defend their position and had to abandon the bridges in Wijchen to the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment.

Day 6: Friday, September 22 ("Black Friday")

The Germans, wary after unsuccessful and costly attacks the previous day, shelled and mortared the airborne positions heavily in lieu of additional direct assaults. By the end of the battle some 110 artillery pieces had been brought into place around Oosterbeek as the Germans shifted to the tactics that had worked so well at the Arnhem bridge. Direct attacks were limited in nature, conducted against specific positions and even individual houses. Numerous well-sited British anti-tank guns also caused German reluctance to attack directly. The survivors of the 1st Airborne were outnumbered 4 to 1. – The Polish 1st Parachute Brigade at Driel, unable to cross the Rhine, nonetheless caused a major redeployment of German forces. Fearing a Polish attempt to recapture Arnhem bridge or, worse, an attempt to cut the road to the south and so trap the 10th SS Panzer Division then blocking the route of the Guards Armoured Division northwards to Arnhem, the Germans withdrew 2,400 troops from Oosterbeek. They were moved south of the river to engage the Polish paratroopers at Driel, making attacks with little real effect throughout the day.

Link-up between the Polish and XXX Corps

The fog lifted as leading elements of the 43rd Division attempted to advance to Driel, exposing them to German fire. They arrived in Driel during the evening. Lacking assault craft, an unsuccessful attempt was made that night to put elements of the Polish brigade across the river. British and Polish engineers on both sides of the Rhine had worked throughout the day to improvise a crossing using small boats linked by signals cable, but the cable consistently broke, forcing the Polish troops to slowly row across against the strong current. The attempt was made under enemy observation and fire, and only 52 soldiers of the 8th Polish Parachute Company survived the crossing before a halt was called at dawn.While much of the corridor along "Hell's Highway" was firmly in Allied hands, German counterattacks were still being mounted along its length. During the previous night, two mixed armoured formations on either side of Highway 69 attacked between Veghel and Grave; one group managed to cut the highway and prevent any further advance to Arnhem.

Day 7: Saturday, September 23

The Germans had figured out what the Poles were attempting to do, and they spent the rest of the day trying to cut off the British in their northern bridgehead from the riverside. The British managed to hold on, and both sides suffered heavy losses. The Germans also attacked the Poles on the south side in order to tie them down, but several tanks arrived from XXX Corps and they were beaten off. Boats and engineers from the Canadian army also arrived that day, and another river crossing that night landed another 150 troops of the Polish 3rd Parachute Battalion on the northern bank of the Rhine. To the south several more German attacks from their position astride the road were stopped, but the road was still cut. XXX Corps then sent a unit of the Guards Armoured Division 19 km (12 miles) south and re-took the road. The rest of the force to the north continued to wait for infantry to move up, still only a few kilometers south of Arnhem. The 325th GIR was finally delivered to reinforce the 82nd Airborne, originally planned for September 19, and while it was immediately 75% effective, arrived far too late to effect the outcome of the battle in that sector.

Day 8: Sunday, September 24

Another German force successfully attacked the road to the south of Veghel and set up defensive positions for the night. It was not clear to the Allies at this point how much of a danger this represented, but the principal objective of Operation Market Garden, i.e. the Allied crossing of the Rhine, was essentially abandoned this day, and the decision made to go over to the defensive with a new front line in Nijmegen. Nevertheless, an attempt was made on Sunday night to reinforce the 1st Airborne Division with the 4th Battalion, The Dorsetshire Regiment. Two companies were put across the river, however the location of the crossing point was ill-advised and the Dorsets landed among prepared German positions. Fragmented by their landing and immediately pinned down, of the 315 men who crossed only 75 reached Oosterbeek; the remainder were taken prisoner. As a result of this failure, it was decided to withdraw the 1st Airborne Division from its bridgehead on the northern side of the Rhine.

Day 9: Monday, September 25

At dawn, the 1st Airborne Division received their orders to withdraw across the Rhine. This could not be effected until nightfall, and in the meantime the division struggled to survive. In a departure from their cautious, attritional tactics of the previous days, the Germans formed two potent SS battlegroups and made a significant thrust along a narrow front in the eastern sector. This succeeded in breaking through the thin front line, and for a time the division was in peril. However, the attack met with increasing resistance as it pushed deeper into the British lines, and was finally broken up by a heavy bombardment of the 64th Medium Regiment.

Employing every ruse to give the Germans the impression that their positions were unchanged, the 1st Airborne Division began its withdrawal at 22:00. British and Canadian engineer units ferried the troops across the Rhine, covered by the Polish 3rd Parachute Battalion on the north bank. By early the next morning they had withdrawn 2,398 survivors, leaving 300 men to surrender on the north bank at first light, when German fire prevented their rescue. Of approximately 10,600 men of the 1st Airborne Division and other units who fought north of the Rhine, 1,485 had died and 6,414 were taken prisoner, of whom one third were wounded.

To the south the newly-arrived 50th (Northumbrian) Division attacked the Germans holding the highway, and secured it by the next day. Allied positions in the Nijmegen Salient, as it came to be known, were manned throughout the rest of September and October by airborne units, then handed over to the First Canadian Army in November 1944 and remained unchanged until February 1945 when Operation Veritable was launched on the Rhineland, advancing east instead of north towards Arnhem.

The grave of an unknown Allied airborne soldier at Arnhem, photographed after its liberation in 1945.

Debate on Allied Strategy and Tactics Operation Market Garden has remained a controversial battle for several reasons. Both Allied tactics and strategy have been debated. The operation was the result of a strategy debate at the highest levels of Allied command in Europe. Much post-war analysis has thus probed the alternatives that were not taken, such as giving priority to first securing the Scheldt estuary.